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Abstract- Rijndael was standardized in 2001 by National 
Institute of Standard and Technology as the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES). AES is still being used to encrypt 
financial, military and even government confidential data. In 
2005, Bernstein illustrated a remote cache timing attack on AES 
using the client-server architecture and therefore proved a side 
channel in its software implementation. Over the years, a 
number of countermeasures have been proposed against cache 
timing attacks both using hardware and software. Although the 
software based countermeasures are flexible and easy to deploy, 
most of such countermeasures are vulnerable to statistical 
analysis. In this paper, we propose a novel software based 
countermeasure against cache timing attacks, known as constant 
time encryption, which we believe is secure against statistical 
analysis. The countermeasure we proposed performs 
rescheduling of instructions such that the encryption rounds will 
consume constant time independent of the cache hits and misses. 
Through experiments, we prove that our countermeasure is 
secure against Bernstein’s cache timing attack. 
 
Keywords—side channel, cache timing attack, constant time 
encryption 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Caesar cipher is named after Julius Caesar, in which 
each letter in the plaintext is replaced by another letter some 
fixed number of positions down the alphabet to protect 
messages of military significance [7]. Starting from Caesar 
cipher cryptography has come a long way with the invention 
of Computers and the Internet. Today cryptography holds an 
important role since a large amount of military and financial 
data are being transferred through the Internet, an unsecure 
media, as digital data. 
In 1976 National Bureau of Standards (NBS) selected the 
Data Encryption Standard (DES), which is a block cipher, as 
an official Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 
for United States. DES used 56 bits key size that became 
insecure with the increasing processing power of the 
computers. In 1999 distributed.net and Electronic Frontier 
Foundation in collaboration publicly broke a DES key within 
22 hours and 15 minutes. In addition, in 1996, Paul C. Kocher 
published a paper [1], which illustrated a timing attack for 
public key algorithms. 
In 1996, National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), previously known as NBS, called for new encryption 
algorithms to be the next generation encryption algorithm. In 
November 2001 after a 5 year of standardization, Rijndael 
was chosen to be the next generation encryption standard [2], 
formally named AES (Advanced encryption standard). 
Today, most of the military, financial, and government 
confidential data are being encrypted by AES [3] and 
therefore it plays a major role in cyber security. 
Unlike DES, AES does not use a Feistel structure; instead, 
it uses a substitution and permutation network that is fast in 
hardware as well as in software. AES can encrypt a 128-bit 
block at a time, which is represented as a 16-byte array (4x4) 
referred as a state array. As depicted in Figure 1, AES is 
composed of the following four steps: sub byte, shift rows, 
mix columns and add round key, which are used to build the 
cipher from a plain text. 
Repeated: 
10 rounds for 128bit key, 
12 rounds for 192bit key, 
14 rounds for 256bit key 












Figure 1.  The AES Algorithm as a Block Diagram 
AES supports three key sizes 128 bit, 192 bit and 256 bit 
and differing number of rounds based on the key size 10, 12 
and 14 respectively. In the software implementation of AES, 
to speed up the encryption process, sub byte, shift columns 
and mix rows calculations are pre-calculated and are made as 
table (T tables) lookups. There are four T tables with each the 
size of 1 KB. Typically the use of T tables in the software 
implementation of AES will increase the encryption 
performance by 60 times compared to the one without using 
them.   
An attacker uses cryptanalysis to study the methods of 
obtaining the valuable information hidden in the cipher text. 
It is a vast study, which varies from frequency analysis to 
rubber horse analysis. One prominent cryptanalysis is the side 
channel attack [4]. The side channel attack is a crypto attack 
that is performed on the physical implementation of a crypto 
system. For example timing information [5], power 
consumption, electromagnetic radiation and even the cache 
content are considered side channels.  
When NIST analysed AES for security vulnerabilities, they 
considered data dependent rotations and branching conditions 
as the only side channels. However using the timing 
variations caused by cache hits and misses due to T tables, 
Daniel Bernstein illustrated a remote cache timing attack on 
AES in April 2005 [6]. In October 2005, Osvik et al. 
presented a paper demonstrating several cache timing attacks 
against AES, where one of their attacks could break the AES 
in 65 milliseconds with 800 encryptions [7].  
In 2009 July Biryukov and Dmitry [8] described a relative 
key attack, which is performed on 192 bit AES and 256 bit 
AES. Vincent Rijmen [9] published an ironic paper on 
“chosen-key-relations-on the middle” attacks on AES in 2010 
July.  
In this paper, we consider the remote cache timing attack 
described by Daniel Bernstein. We demonstrate how a 
constant time encryption technique could be used in a 
software implementation of AES so that the system is secure 
against cache timing attacks. We demonstrate our solution on 
an environment as proposed by Bernstein and show that with 
the countermeasure proposed, AES is safe against Bernstein’s 
cache timing attack. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II 
we describe the typical countermeasures proposed against 
cache timing attack and group them into a number of 
categorises. Section III presents our methodology where we 
introduce the notion of constant time encryption in this papers 
context and how it can be applied to AES. We present the 
implementation of our countermeasure in Section IV where 
we illustrate how our methodology, constant time encryption, 
is applied in a software implementation of AES. In Section V, 
we present our results, that is how our methodology mitigates 
Bernstein’s cache timing attack and the relevant overheads 
and in Section VI we conclude our paper. 
II. EXISTING COUNTERMEASURES 
Since side channel attacks rely on by-products of the 
physical implementation of crypto systems, adding noise or 
covering the side channel s will eliminate the vulnerability 
and therefore the attack. Countermeasures prevent deducting 
the secret key in two ways: (1) reducing the time variance so 
that the attacker will not see the differences of cache hits and 
misses, (2) increasing the time difference so that it results in a 
different key space, which does not contain the secret key.  
Researchers have proposed many countermeasures to 
prevent remote cache timing attack including, loading T 
tables into registers [4], adding hardware components to 
calculate T tables [4], introducing smaller T tables that would 
fit into the cache [2], and masking evicted timing delays from 
the cache. All the countermeasures have performance impact 
and they are investigated in [6]. Following are the 
descriptions of the already proposed countermeasures: 
A. Loading T tables in to the registers: If the CPU register file 
is large such that it can hold four T tables, the T tables 
can be accessed with a constant time. However, 
commonly used hardware architectures (such as x86 or 
ARM) do not have enough registers to hold all four T 
tables. Even worse, making your own “special” register 
file in hardware is expensive as they will consume a 
large portion of your processor floor space.  
B. Adding hardware components to calculate T tables: If the 
functional units necessary for computing T table values 
are embedded into the core or die as a hardware 
component, then the T table lookups are not necessary. 
Intel has implemented this feature in new processor 
family (i.e. core i5 and core i7). However, such 
components are going to consume lot of logic gates and 
therefore not feasible in the current embedded 
microprocessors. 
C. Smaller T tables that would fit into the cache:  Either one 
has to start from S boxes or some intermediate table the 
size of which is in between S box Tables and T tables 
and calculate the rest. T tables were introduced to speed 
up the software encryption process. Therefore, using a 
smaller table and calculating rest will have a huge 
performance penalty. In addition, if the intermediate 
table does not fit in to the cache with the encryption data, 
then the vulnerability will still be there. 
D. Masking evicted timing information from the cache: Adding 
random loops, random sleeps in the middle of the encryption 
will cause false timing details that will lead to a wrong key 
space. From the previous experiments, it has been proved that 
this has the least performance impact. However, such masking 
can be vulnerable to the statistical analysis; that is, by repeating 
the attack many times one can remove the random noise using 
statistical methods. Therefore, the vulnerability can be still 
there. 
E. Pre-fetching: Pre-fetching can be applicable to either 
hardware or operating system. If the relevant T tables can 
be fetched before it actually is needed, it will cause no 
cache misses. To perform hardware pre-fetching, special 
hardware is needed which are not provided in 
microprocessors that come with day-to-day computers.  
F. Disabling the cache: If the cache in the system is disabled, then 
the RAM memory of the system has to be utilised to store the T 
tables. The RAM (Random Access Memory) is large 
enough to hold all the T tables. Therefore, every access 
will take the same amount of time, thus removing the 
vulnerability (we ignore operating system’s memory 
paging for now). However, since the RAM is far slower 
than the cache there will be a huge performance penalty. 
Moreover, disabling the cache should be supported by 
the hardware and the operating system kernel. Only a 
few desktop motherboards support disabling the L2 
cache and typical operating systems do not allow cache 
disabling. 
III. CONSTANT TIME ENCRYPTION 
We define a cryptosystem to have constant time encryption, 
when it consumes equal amount of time for all encryption 
rounds independent of the data being encrypted. Typically, 
achieving constant time encryption could take two paths: one 
is to deploy a cache that is large enough to hold all four T 
tables (plus the rest of the data) and therefore producing all 
cache hits and the other is to have a system without a cache 
where the performance of the system will be degraded due to 
high latency memory accesses. In both cases, the time taken 
to access data from different parts of the memory or cache 
will be a constant and therefore constant time encryption.  
In this paper, we take a third approach, where we maintain 
the same cache structure of the system (that is, we propose 
not to do any hardware changes). However, we achieve 
constant time encryption via scheduling the instructions such 
that the encryption rounds will circumvent delays due to 
cache misses. Let us look at an example. Assume a cache hit 
latency of 2 clock cycles, a miss latency of 6 clock cycles and 
instruction execution latency of 1 clock cycle. Figure 2 
depicts an instruction sequence (Figure 2a) and how it can be 
rescheduled to avoid time delay due to cache misses (Figure 
2b).  
In Figure 2a, the second instruction in the sequence is a 
load instruction and instruction number 6 uses the data loaded 
in instruction 2. When the load instruction encounters a cache 
hit, the data loaded will be available from instruction 3. 
However, when there is a cache miss for the load instruction, 
the data loaded will only be available from instruction 8. 
Therefore, although a cache hit will not delay the execution 
of instruction 6, a cache miss will. This is the fact that causes 
the time difference and therefore the vulnerability. As shown 
in Figure 2b, if instruction 6 can be rescheduled to the eighth 
location (let us assume that instructions e and f do not depend 
on instruction 6), then for both a cache miss and a cache hit 
the use data instruction is going to behave the same way 
achieving constant time encryption. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Rescheduling for Constant Time Encryption 
Details of how the idea presented in this section on 
constant time encryption is applied to the software 
implementation of AES are discussed in the following 
section. 
IV. SCHEDULING THE AES INSTRUCTIONS  
OpenSSL code for AES encryption is written in C and it is 
organized as shown in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Block Diagram of OpenSSL AES Code 
Pre-calculated variables of s are used at the start in block 
(a) then the updated values of t(s) are used to calculate 
variables of s again. At last, the final round is executed and 
the cipher text is copied into memory.  The rest of this section 
illustrates how the manual scheduling of the AES OpenSSL 
instructions can be done with examples. Our manual 
intervention to the compiler supported scheduling has three 
major steps and they are discussed in the rest of this section. 
 
A. Decomposing the OpenSSL AES encryption code into 
smaller bitwise operations.  
For example the code segment shown in Figure 4, which is 
part of the OpenSSL AES encryption code, can be 
decomposed into smaller bitwise operations as shown in 
Figure 5. Such decomposition is typically part of the 
instruction scheduling process of a compiler.  
 
 
Figure 4.  A Sample Source Code from OpenSSL AES Encryption 
During our manual scheduling process, we performed this 
decomposition ourselves so that we will be able to apply the 
rest of the steps without modifying the compiler. However, 
such changes can be integrated into a compiler, so that the 






Figure 5.  Decomposed Bitwise Operations for Code Segment in Figure 4 
In Bernstein’s attack, the AES source codes are compiled 
in gcc with “–O3” optimization. However due to the manual 
scheduling we would like to perform and to make sure that 
the compiler does not undo our scheduling, we will not use 
gcc’s optimizations. As mentioned earlier, the decomposed 
program for the code segment in Figure 4 will look like the 
one in Figure 5. Intermediate variables are used to hold the 
data temporally. The decomposition we perform and not 
using the complier’s optimization options would increase the 




Figure 6.  The Code Segment Scheduled to avoid Side Channel Attack 
B. Add each and every bitwise instruction sets to queues. 
Adding the decomposed instructions to queues will make 
our scheduling easier to implement using a computer program 
and therefore the scheduling can be automated. 
 
C. Processing each queue. 
Each queue can be executed separately since they are data 
and control independent from each other. However, we want 
to hide the data loading time in arithmetic operations so that 
the instructions can be scheduled as shown below: 
u00 = s0; 
u01 = s1; 
u02 = s2; 
u00 = u00>>24; 
u01 = u01>>16; 
….. 
 
If a processor has x number of arithmetic pipeline stages 
then, the second instruction of a queue can be scheduled after 
x number of arithmetic instructions.  
When there are no arithmetic instructions to be filled in 
between scheduled instructions we used asm(“nop”) 
instruction to stall the processor. This will add a performance 
penalty to the encryption but will protect OpenSSL AES 
encryption by providing a constant time encryption. By 
repeating until you finish all the code segments in Figure 5, 
you will end up with a code segment as shown in Figure 6. 
This is a portion of the code we tested for a pipeline depth of 
6. As shown in Figure 4, the first T table entry Te0 is referred 
and it is used exactly after pipeline stage 6.  
The whole process described above can be automate using 
a computer program and tested for performance. Since a rule 
based scheduling has been used to rearrange the AES 
encryption, the code generated by tool requires more CPU 
time than AES encryption code scheduled by manually. 
V. RESULTS 
The efficiency and the security of the countermeasure we 
proposed are tested with a Pentium III CPU, which is running 
FreeBSD 4.8, OpenSSL 0.9.7a and gcc-2.95.3. This is the 
environment where Bernstein’s attack was proposed and we 
use this environment to verify our proposed countermeasure. 
When compiling the AES source code, “-O3” optimization is 
not used as mentioned earlier as it will remove the 
asm(“nop”) instructions and might rearrange the other code 
segments we scheduled manually.  
TABLE I.  PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
Pipeline Depth 








Table I shows the clock cycle consumption of the system 
with the countermeasure with various pipeline depth 
considered. In our environment, the unprotected OpenSSL 
AES code takes about 6000 clock cycles. From the 
Bernstein’s C source codes provided with paper [5], the 
measured time taken to encrypt a packet is not just the time to 
encrypt the packet. It is the time taken to execute from line 2 
to line 8 as shown in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7.  Measuring Clock Cycles 
Therefore, the clock cycle values mentioned in Table I are 
not just the time taken only for AES encryption. It takes only 
about 500-600 numbers of cycles to execute the AES 
encryption code on the experimental computer we configured 
and therefore we have scheduled a small portion compared to 
the total number of cycles (approximately 10%).   
 
Figure 8.  Timing Data for Unprotected OpenSSL 
As shown in Figure 8, the unprotected OpenSSL clearly 
has timing data evicted during the encryption process. The 
graph in Figure 8 is produced for 11
th
 key byte. The 
horizontal axis is the choice of n[11], from 0 through 255.  
The vertical axis is the average number of clock cycles for a 
large number of 800-byte packets with that choice of n[11], 
minus the average number of cycles for all choices of n[11]. 
It is clearly seen that some possibilities such as n[11]=52 and 
n[11]=30 make the average which was calculated, to deviate 
from the average. This information leakage will be a good 
side channel for the attacker and therefore the software 
implementation of AES becoming vulnerable. 
Figure 9 is drawn for the timing data for the protected 
OpenSSL AES encryption process. All the data lie in a small 
region of +1.5 to -3.0. Therefore the timing data is not visible 
enough for the attacker to deduce the secret key. However, in 




graph. One can conclude reducing the margin will help to 
find the secret key. But reducing the margin of the correlation 
program will increase the number of possibilities of the key 
space. Therefore the attacker will not get much gain by 
reducing the margin. Since we were unable to find the 
suitable pipe line stages of a Pentium III processor, the 
efficacy of the countermeasure is tested for various number of 
pipeline stages. 
 
Figure 9.  Timing Data for Protected OpenSSL with the Countermeasures 
Table III shows the performance overhead due to the 
countermeasure proposed against various number of pipeline 
depths considered. According to Table II the variation of the 
performance degradation is very small as the pipeline depth 
changes. Therefore, we can conclude that all the pipeline 
depths have almost same efficiency, because the difference 
between 1.21 and 1.25 is small when it is considered in the 
practical scenario.  
 
TABLE II.  TOTAL OVERHEAD 
Pipeline Depth 
Performance degradation 








Through Bernstein’s attack, we checked the efficacy of our 
countermeasure. That is, we put the AES implementation 
with the countermeasure incorporated under test. Table III 
shows the key space what was discovered by Bernstein’s 
attack on the OpenSSL AES implementation that was 
protected with our countermeasure. From Table III when the 
pipeline depth is 12 it is reported that the maximum key space 
of 3.4x10
38
 which is almost equal to the brute force attack.  
When then pipeline depth is 10 it gives a small key space 
compared to other key spaces but it is more likely a deviated 
key space from the correct one. Therefore, we would 
conclude that out of the considered pipeline depths, 12 have 
given the best countermeasure. 
TABLE III.  TOTAL KEY SPACE WITH THE COUNTERMEASURE 
Pipeline Depth Key Space 
6 3.22 E 37 
8 3.22 E 37 
10 2.00 E 33 
12 3.40 E 38 
14 1.33 E 18 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Previous researches proved that the famous block cyber, 
AES, is vulnerable to cache timing attack, a famous side-
channel attack. Typical software based countermeasures 
proposed in the past against cache timing attack are 
vulnerable to statistical analysis. In this paper, we propose a 
software based countermeasure known as constant time 
encryption that we believe is secure against cache timing 
attack including statistical analysis. The constant time 
encryption proposed makes sure that the encryption rounds 
take same amount of clock cycles independent of the cache 
hits and misses, eliminating the side-channel vulnerability 
existed in the past. However, our countermeasure is going to 
burden the programmer with additional challenges such as 
identifying the pipeline depth of a processor and 
programming accordingly and the changes we make to the 
software code will make it non-portable.  
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